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HELPFULNESS, EFFORT, AND UTILITY
Abstract
How do children consider helpfulness, specifically effort and utility, when evaluating potential
informants? We tested preschoolers on three conditions, asking them to choose between a
character high in both effort and utility and a character who acted with either 1) low effort and
high utility, 2) high effort and low utility, or 3) low effort and no utility (removed from social
contexts). The opposing characters provided conflicting information when labeling novel
objects, and participants were asked which label they endorsed. They were then asked to choose
which character was the more helpful, which worked harder, and which was nicer. We found
trends toward endorsing words from the helpful over no social context character. Participants
chose the helpful character as more helpful and hardworking compared to the low utility
character, and as working harder compared to the no social context character. These trends
indicate that children focus on utility and social contribution over effort when evaluating the
helpfulness of a potential informant.
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Is it the thought that counts?
Investigating children’s understanding of helpfulness, effort, and utility
Much of our knowledge has been acquired not from direct observation but from the
testimony of others (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). However, not all informants are equally
worthy of trust—they may be incompetent, irrelevant, ignorant, deceptive, or unpleasant (e.g.,
Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Because of this, it is important to be able to determine whether a
potential informant is trustworthy—able and willing to provide accurate information.
Primary to whether a child trusts information from an informant is the child’s evaluation
of that informant’s positive (or negative) capacities in intellectual and social dimensions (Fiske,
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; see also Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009;
Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 2012). Typically, an informant’s capacity on the intellectual
dimension has been understood as competence (e.g., Fiske et al., 2007; Mascaro & Sperber,
2009; Landrum et al., 2013) and measured in terms of characteristics that indicate an informant’s
ability to provide accurate information, such as prior history of accuracy (e.g., Brosseau-Liard &
Birch, 2010; Koenig & Harris, 2005), expertise (e.g., Aguiar, Stoess, & Taylor, 2012; Landrum
et al., 2013; Lutz & Keil, 2002), and relevance to the domain at hand (e.g., Danovitch & Keil,
2007). Informants’ capacities on the warmth dimension have included such concepts as intention
(e.g., Mascaro & Sperber, 2009) and affect (i.e., the informant’s demeanor, or degree of niceness
or meanness; Landrum et al., 2013).
Generally, research has indicated that children prefer to learn from informants who are
competent, have a history of accuracy, and are able to provide task-relevant information (see
Mills, 2013, for a review). For example, with regard to competence, Cluver, Heyman, and Carver
(2013) found that children as young as 20 to 24 months prefer to seek information from “good

HELPFULNESS, EFFORT, AND UTILITY

4

helpers” rather than “bad helpers” when solving problems. That is, they preferred those who had
previously demonstrated the correct way to access a novel toy and demonstrated high levels of
social engagement (e.g., varied voice pitch, made frequent eye contact) over those who had
demonstrated an incorrect way to access a novel toy and had shown low levels of social
engagement (e.g., spoke in monotone voice, avoided direct eye contact). Similarly, regarding a
history of providing accurate information, both 3- and 4-year-olds preferred to endorse
information from a previously accurate informant over a previously inaccurate one (Koenig &
Harris, 2005). Finally, with regard to the provision of task-relevant information, research finds
that, by the age of 4, children demonstrate an understanding of experts and the sort of knowledge
they would be expected to possess. For example, children are able to attribute domain-relevant
information to the proper expert, ascribing medical knowledge to a doctor rather than a car
mechanic (Lutz & Keil, 2002). Moreover, by the 2nd grade, children presented with a dilemma
are able to apply this understanding by choosing problem-solving advisors based on whether or
not they had expertise relevant to the domain in which the dilemma occurred (Danovitch & Keil,
2007).
An informant’s capacity on the “warmth” dimension of social cognition (Fiske et al.,
2007) has also been shown to be important in making epistemic choices. Research by Mascaro
and Sperber (2009) found that children prefer to trust a benevolent informant (kind, wellintentioned) over a malevolent informant (unkind, mal-intentioned). By age 3, children prefer to
believe information provided by a benevolent informant over a malevolent one, and by age 5,
children are able to make more sophisticated inferences, anticipating, for example, that someone
described as intending to deceive the participant is likely telling falsehoods. Additional research
has expanded this finding by showing that 4-year-olds exhibit an understanding of the probable
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helpfulness of “helpers” and “trickers,” but only by age 5 do they apply this knowledge in
choosing a helpful informant over a deceptive one (Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011).
In order to understand how children jointly weigh these sorts of factors when making
epistemic judgments, studies have begun to examine two or more of these factors together (e.g.,
Landrum et al., 2013; Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 2013). Although preschool-age children have
been found to trust a relevant expert over an irrelevant expert, and a nice expert over a mean
expert, when competence and benevolence information conflicts (e.g., a mean expert), children
endorse information from a nice non-expert over that from a mean expert. (Landrum et al.,
2013). Examining the question from a different perspective, Liu, Vanderbilt, and Heyman (2013)
found that 5- and 6-year-olds take both informant intent and reliability into account when
choosing whom to trust: children tend to prefer informants with benevolent intent regardless of
the accuracy of their testimony, but they also tend to prefer informants with previous accurate
testimony regardless of inferred intent. This research is consistent with findings indicating that
children tend to have a preference for positively-valenced informants, that is, a “halo effect”
(e.g., Boseovski, 2012), and that children tend to have an aversion to negatively valenced
informants, that is, a “pitchfork effect” (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011).
One facet of the field of epistemic judgment which has yet to be investigated in depth is
how children evaluate informants within the “warmth” dimension of social cognition (Fiske et
al., 2007). Several studies have linked this social dimension with various informant features,
such as intention (Liu et al.; Vanderbilt et al., 2011), niceness or kindness (Landrum et al., 2013;
Lane et al., 2013), and helpfulness (e.g., Shafto et al., 2012). Although research has shown that,
for example, children prioritize informant niceness over expertise (Landrum et al., 2013) and
intention over accuracy (Liu et al., 2013), it is unclear how children are conceptualizing the
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social dimension. Are they thinking of it simply in terms of positive affect (e.g., trusting a nice
person whether or not he/she is particularly helpful)? Or, do children demonstrate more
sophisticated inferences that show they understand what it means to be helpful? That is, do they
understand that helpfulness is more than just being nice or being willing to put forth effort, but
requires providing task-relevant assistance that helps achieve a goal?
The current study begins to examine these open questions. Specifically, we investigate
how children weigh effort and task relevance (i.e., utility) when making epistemic judgments.
Does an individual’s high level of effort exerted imbue him or her with positive social valence,
even if his or her efforts are fruitless? Or does an individual’s constructive contribution to a goal
speak more to his or her helpfulness and social valence than does their level of effort? In this
study, we specifically wished to examine how children evaluated individuals who differed in
their levels of demonstrated effort and utility as well as whether children would leverage this
experience to trust an informant in a novel word learning task (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). In
this context, effort is defined as “a strenuous putting forth of power, physical or mental; a
laborious attempt; a struggle” (OED, n.d.). Though both mental and physical exertion would be
worthwhile concepts to examine, in this study we chose to consider the more tangible and
testable concept of physical effort in an attempt to ensure that the type of effort tested was
consistent throughout the study. Utility here is defined as “the fact, character, or quality of being
useful or serviceable; fitness for some desirable purpose or valuable end; usefulness,
serviceableness” (OED, n.d.). Rather than examining the philosophical or economic constructs of
utility, this study again focused on the more concrete concept of being serviceable in reaching a
valuable end. Crossing these two features, along with niceness, allows us to examine how
children are weighing different types of features along the social dimension.
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Method
We presented children with two opposing characters: one character always performed
actions indicating a high level of both effort and utility to a goal and a second character who
performed actions exemplifying various combinations of high and low effort and utility, as
described below. Thus we could examine whether children focus more on cues indicating a
character’s effort or utility in choosing from whom they would like to learn. Examining
children’s perceptions of and choices regarding characters who varied in both effort and utility,
enabled us to make inferences about how children understand these concepts in relation to one
another—that is, how they are conceptualizing the warmth dimension of social cognition.
Participants
Twenty-four participants, including fourteen females and ten males (age: M = 4.05 years;
range: 3.08 – 5.07 years) were recruited from local preschools in the Louisville Metro area. This
range of ages is in keeping with research indicating that many of children’s epistemic judgment
capabilities develop during this time (e.g., Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; Vanderbilt et al., 2011).
Procedure
This experiment used a within-subjects design to test three scenarios (i.e., conditions; see
Table 1). In each condition, children were introduced to a set of characters (during a training
phase) and then answered a series of questions (during a testing phase). These procedures are
described in more detail below.
Table 1. Examples of each condition and scenario from the study. While we kept the order of
the scenarios consistent, the order of the conditions was counterbalanced between participants. In
addition, we counterbalanced which character was presented first, as well as character names and
appearances.
Scenarios
Block tower
Pulling Weeds
Jar of Candy
Dilemma
Arms hurt too badly to carry the Too tired and sore
Jar with favorite
very last block all the way over from pulling weeds
candy inside is stuck

HELPFULNESS, EFFORT, AND UTILITY
from across the room and place
on top of the block tower.
Helpful
Character
Every
Condition
Low Utility
Character
Condition 1
Low Effort
Informant
Condition 2
No Social
Context
Character
Condition 3
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from a flower garden
for a long time and
needs help to finish.
Works a lot to pull
strong weeds from the
tough ground in the
garden.

and will not come
open no matter how
hard she tries.
Works a lot with the
main character to
open her jar until it
finally opens.

Works a lot to push a heavy
desk from across the room to
use later.

Works a lot to wash
the dirty windows of
the house.

Works a lot to open a
box of toys until it
finally opens.

Works a little to slide a block
from across the room with her
foot so it is next to the main
character.
In an empty room, works a lot
to carry a block from across the
room and place on top of the
tower.

Works a little to bring
the main character a
shovel and gloves to
use in pulling weeds.
At an empty house no
one lives in, works a
lot to pull up weeds
from that garden.

Works a little to hand
the main character a
towel aid in opening
the jar.
In an empty room,
finds a jar of candy
and works a lot to
open it.

Works a lot to carry block from
across the room and places it on
top of the tower.

Training phase.
For each condition’s training phase, children were shown illustrations introducing them
to two similar scenarios in adjacent locations. This method of using pictures and brief narrations
to introduce a character and his/her traits was based on the method used by Lane, Wellman, and
Gelman (2013). In two of the conditions, children were presented with two initial characters (one
in each location) that faced identical dilemmas (e.g., building a block tower with heavy blocks)
that an additional character (i.e., a friend who might plausibly share the main character’s goal)
could potentially help resolve (see Figure 1). Each of the two friends performed a different action
based on the condition in which they occur. In the third condition (explained in more detail
below), there was not an initial character facing a dilemma in one of the two locations as this
condition was intentionally not goal-oriented (and thus, non-social). In this condition, the friend
was present and engaging in an action, but alone.
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Figure 1. The first two images from Condition 1. The first image introduces the two initial
characters with an identical dilemma (in this case, completing a block tower). The second image
introduces two friends with different ways of responding to this dilemma.
Character A in each condition always performed actions characterized by exerting a high
level of physical effort and a high level of utility (usefulness, relevance) to a friend’s goal,
whereas Character B performed actions which were different in each condition. Below,
Character A will be referred to as the “Helpful Character” and Character B will be referred to by
the characteristic which differentiates him/her from Character A. In Condition 1, Character B
(i.e., Low Effort Character) was characterized as having low effort but high utility: s/he
performed actions which required little physical effort, yet did have utility toward his/her and the
first character’s shared goal. In Condition 2, Character B (i.e., Low Utility Character) was
characterized as having high effort but low utility: s/he performed actions which required great
physical effort, yet did not have utility toward the shared goal. Condition 3, the “no social
information” condition, was distinct from Conditions 1 and 2. In this condition, Character B (i.e.,
No Social Context Character) was characterized by having high effort but no utility: s/he
performed actions which were identical to those in Condition 1 (requiring great physical effort
and accomplishing some task), yet this character was in a scenario in which no other individuals
were present, and therefore had no social context or shared goal. Thus his or her completed
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action technically had no utility, as it did not contribute to solving a problem or reaching a goal.
There were three potential preschool-level dilemmas or problems to be dealt with. See
Table 1 above for details regarding each dilemma and the way each character responded.
Testing phase.
During the testing phase, participants were asked a series of three types of question items
designed to infer their perception of each character and the epistemic choices they would make
regarding the characters: endorsement items, memory check items, and explicit judgment items.
Each of these item types are discussed in more detail below.
Endorsement items.
In each condition, children were shown photographs of four novel objects (i.e., unusual
kitchen gadgets), and each of the two characters provided conflicting information as to what the
proper name for the novel object is. These pairs of words for labeling novel objects (e.g., Wug
and Dax, Merval and Feppin) were taken from the study by Landrum et al. (2013), which
similarly presented children with a novel word-pairs task. With each novel object and pair of
words, children were asked which of the two characters they believed was most likely providing
the correct name for each of four novel objects. For instance, participants might have heard,
“Here’s what the first toy looked like. Brooke said it’s a Wug and Julie said it’s a Dax. Who do
you think is right? Point to their picture.” Thus, we used the number of times out of four that
children chose to learn from the Helpful Character as the dependent variable in order to measure
their overall preference for learning from one type of informant over another.
Memory check items.
Next, for the memory check items, children were asked which character performed which
action in order to determine whether children were accurately tracking the information provided
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about each character. For example, in the “block tower” scenario of Condition 1, participants
were asked “Who carried a heavy block across the room to Mary, Brooke or Julie? And who slid
a block across the room with her foot, Brooke or Julie?” These responses were used later to
determine whether children who responded accurately to these questions had significantly
different responses in the endorsement items and explicit judgment items than those who did not
remember accurately.
Explicit judgment items.
Finally, for the explicit judgment items, children were asked to provide ratings indicating
their perceptions of each character as helpful, effortful, and nice. Participants were asked Yes or
No questions about each character and whether or not they were helpful. A forced-choice
question was then asked about which character the participant believed was the most helpful.
The number of times participants responded that the Helpful Character in every condition and the
Low Effort (but high utility) Character in Condition 1 were helpful and the number of times they
chose the Helpful Character as the more helpful were the dependent variables.
Next, participants were asked how hard each character worked. They were given similar
Yes or No questions asking whether or not each character worked hard, then a forced-choice
question asking which character worked harder. The number of times participants responded that
the Helpful Character in every condition, Low Utility (but high effort) Character in Condition 2,
and No Social Context (but high effort) Character in Condition 3 worked hard and the number of
times they chose the Helpful Character as the hardest working were the dependent variables.
Finally, participants were asked to rate how nice each character was. They were again
given two Yes or No questions, now asking if each character was nice, and were then given a
forced-choice question to determine which they perceived as being nicer. The number of times
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participants responded that the Helpful Character in every condition, Low Effort (but high
utility) Character in Condition 1, and Low Utility (but high effort) Character in Condition 2 were
nice and the number of times they chose the Helpful Character as the nicer were the dependent
variables.
After each child had completed the study, s/he was thanked for his/her participation,
given a certificate, and allowed to choose a small toy.
Results
First, we compare novel word endorsement and explicit judgment item results from each
condition to one another in order to determine if there are any differences between conditions—
that is, if participants trust differently when considering various characters who differed in effort
and utility. Then, we consider each condition independently, comparing children’s endorsements
and explicit judgment responses to chance levels in order to determine if the manipulation in
each condition had an effect. Overall, participants were 61% accurate on the memory check
items. There were no significant differences between responses of participants who answered
correctly on the memory check items and those that did not; therefore, memory check responses
were excluded from further analyses.
Comparisons across conditions
First, we were interested in whether the number of endorsements for the Helpful
Character varied based upon condition (with whom the Helpful Character was paired). That is,
we wished to test whether children responded differently when presented with different
characters depicting different levels of effort and utility. To do this, we conducted a repeatedmeasures ANOVA on the number of endorsements for the Helpful Character across the three
within-subjects conditions. We found no significant differences in number of endorsements for
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the Helpful Character between the three conditions, F(2, 46) = 0.793, p = .459, ηp2 = .033. See

Endorsements for Helpful Character

Figure 2.
4

3

2

1

0

Helpful vs. Low Effort

Helpful vs. Low Utility
Conditions

Helpful vs. No Social
Context

Figure 2. Means of endorsements for Helpful Character in each condition.
Second, we were interested in how children’s explicit judgments varied between
conditions, in order to determine whether their perceptions of characters varied as the characters’
levels of effort and utility varied. First, we conducted a chi-square test on the number of times
participants preferred the Helpful Character as being the more helpful across conditions. There
was a trend toward significance in participants’ responses, 2(2) = 4.97, p = 0.08. The greater
frequency with which children favored the Helpful Character when s/he was opposed to the Low
Utility and No Social Context Characters indicates that they tend to perceive characters with high
utility as more helpful than those with lower utility. This suggests that children judge helpfulness
differently when effort and utility varied. Second, we conducted a similar chi-square test
analyzing the number of times children selected the Helpful Character as having worked harder,
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2 (2) = 4.03, p = 0.13. These results suggest that children judge effort differently when utility
and effort varied between characters. Children favored the Helpful Character more frequently in
the Low Utility and No Social Context Conditions, indicating that they tend to perceive
characters with high utility as having worked harder than those with lower utility. Finally, we
conducted a chi-square test analyzing the number of times children selected the Helpful
Character as being nicer across the three within-subjects conditions, 2 (2) = 2.12, p = 0.35. This
would suggest that children do not judge niceness differently when characters vary in utility and
effort.
Condition 1: Helpful vs. Low Effort (but high utility) Character condition
In the helpful versus low effort yet high utility condition, we hypothesized that
participants would prefer to learn novel words from characters exhibiting high levels of effort
over those who exhibit low levels. A single-sample t-test found that participants did not
differently endorse the novel words from the Helpful Character above chance levels, M = 2.04,
SD = 0.806, SE = 0.165, thus not showing a strong preference for either character t(23) = 0.253,
p = .802, d = 0.11. That is, participants viewed the Helpful and Low Effort Characters similarly
when making epistemic judgments.
Next, we hypothesized that participants would perceive both characters as helpful, as they
both demonstrated high utility, yet would perceive the high effort character as being the more
helpful of the two. Participants did perceive the Helpful Character as helpful: 23 of 24
participants rated him/her as such, .96 observed proportion (compared with .50 chance
proportion), p < .001 by a one-tailed binomial test. Nineteen of twenty-four participants also
rated the Low Effort Character as helpful, .79 observed proportion, binomial test p < .001.
Contrary to the hypothesis, participants did not see either character as significantly more helpful
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(Helpful Character: n = 10, observed proportion = .42; Low Effort Character: n = 14, observed
proportion = .58; one-tailed binomial test: p = .271).
We then hypothesized that participants would perceive the high effort, but not the low
effort, character as having worked hard, and would perceive the high effort character as having
worked the harder of the two. Participants perceived both characters as having worked hard
(Helpful Character: n = 22, observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a binomial test; Low Effort
Character: n = 20, observed proportion = .83, p < .001 in a binomial test). Nor did participants
select the Helpful Character as having worked the harder of the two (Helpful Character, n = 12,
observed proportion = .50; Low Effort Character: n = 12, observed proportion = .50; binomial
test: p = .581).
Finally, we hypothesized that participants would perceive both characters as nice, and
would perceive the high effort character as the nicer of the two. Participants did perceive both
characters as being nice (Helpful Character: n = 23, observed proportion = .96, p < .001 in a
binomial test; Low Effort Character: n = 23, observed proportion = .96, p < .001 in a binomial
test). However, participants did not significantly rate the Helpful Character as the nicer of the
two (Helpful Character, n = 10, observed proportion = .42; Low Effort informant: n = 14,
observed proportion = .58; binomial test: p = .271).
In sum, when considering characters who each demonstrate high utility yet vary in effort,
children view both characters as helpful, as working hard, and as nice. Children’s responses
indicate that they do not differentially trust characters who vary in effort, as they neither show a
preference in novel word endorsements nor in rating one character as more helpful, as working
harder, or as nicer.
Condition 2: Helpful vs. Low Utility (but high effort) Character condition
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In the helpful vs. low utility yet high effort condition, we hypothesized that participants
would prefer to learn novel words from characters exhibiting high levels of utility over those
who exhibit low levels. In four trials, participants did not show any preference for learning novel
words from the Helpful Character as compared to the Low Utility Character, M = 2.13, SD =
0.85, SE = 0.174, and in fact did not show a strong preference for either character t(23) = 0.720,
p = .479, d = 0.30 by a single-sample t-test. Thus participants showed no evidence of preferential
trust when considering a character with high utility and one with low utility.
We next hypothesized that participants would perceive the high utility, but not the low
utility, character as having been helpful, and would perceive the high utility character as being
the more helpful of the two. Participants perceived both characters as being helpful, contrary to
the hypothesis (Helpful Character: n = 21, observed proportion = .88, p < .001 in a binomial test;
Low Utility Character: n = 22, observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a binomial test).
Participants significantly rated the Helpful Character as the more helpful of the two (Helpful
Character, n = 17, observed proportion = .71; Low Utility Character: n = 7, observed proportion
= .29; one-tailed binomial test: p = .032). This finding indicates that children were able to detect
a difference in the characters’ respective levels of utility, and therefore chose the Helpful
Character as the more helpful of the two.
We also hypothesized that participants would perceive both characters as having worked
hard, as they both demonstrated high effort, and yet would perceive the high utility character as
having worked the harder of the two. Participants did perceive both characters as having worked
hard (Helpful Character: n = 18, observed proportion = .75, p < .001 in a binomial test; Low
Utility Character: n = 22, observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a binomial test). As
hypothesized, participants did rate the Helpful Character as having worked the harder of the two
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(Helpful Character, n = 18, observed proportion = .75; Low Utility Character: n = 6, observed
proportion = .25; one-tailed binomial test: p = .011). Though both characters demonstrated high
levels of effort, participants showed a preference for rating the Helpful Character as working the
harder of the two, implying a positivity bias toward the character with high utility over the
character with low utility.
Finally, we hypothesized that participants would perceive both characters as nice, and
would perceive the high utility character as the nicer of the two. Participants did perceive both
characters as being nice (Helpful Character: n = 22, observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a
binomial test; Low Utility Character: n = 24, observed proportion = 1.00, p < .001 in a binomial
test). However, they did not rate the Helpful Character as the nicer of the two (Helpful Character,
n = 15, observed proportion = .68; Low Utility Character: n = 9, observed proportion = .38; onetailed binomial test: p = .154).
Children view characters who each demonstrate high levels of effort yet vary in levels of
utility as helpful, as working hard, and as nice. They seem to perceive little difference in the two
characters when endorsing one character’s novel word over the other. Children are able to detect
differences in characters’ demonstrated utility at some level, however, as they rate the Helpful
Character as more helpful and as working harder than the Low Utility Character.
Condition 3: Helpful vs. No Social Context (but high effort) condition
In the helpful vs. no social context yet high effort condition, we hypothesized that
participants would prefer to learn novel words from characters acting in a social context over
those not acting in a social context. In four trials, participants did not show a strong preference
for learning novel words from the Helpful Character as compared to the No Social Context
Character, M = 2.29, SD = 0.91, SE = 0.19, however, there was a trend toward choosing the
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Helpful Character t(23) = 1.574, p = .129, d = 0.66 according to a single-sample t-test. This trend
in the small sample size indicates that children endorse labels for novel words differently when
the opposing characters vary in social context, and therefore utility.
We next hypothesized that participants would perceive the social context, but not the no
social context, character as having been helpful, and would perceive the social context character
as being the more helpful of the two. Participants perceived both characters as helpful (Helpful
Character: n = 21, observed proportion = .88, p < .001 in a binomial test; No Social Context
Character: n = 19, observed proportion = .79, p < .001 in a binomial test). There was a trend
toward rating the Helpful Character as the more helpful of the two (Helpful Character, n = 16,
observed proportion = .67; No Social Context Character: n = 8, observed proportion = .33; onetailed binomial test: p = .076).
We then hypothesized that participants would perceive both characters as having worked
hard, as they both demonstrated high effort, and yet would perceive the social context character
as having worked the harder of the two. Participants did perceive both characters as having
worked hard (Helpful Character: n = 21, observed proportion = .88, p < .001 in a binomial test;
No Social Context Character: n = 22, observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a binomial test). The
Helpful Character was significantly rated as having worked the harder of the two (Helpful
Character, n = 17, observed proportion = .71; No Social Context Character: n = 7, observed
proportion = .29; one-tailed binomial test: p = .032). As in the Helpful vs. Low Utility condition,
when the Helpful Character is paired with a character who has high effort yet low or no utility,
children exhibit a bias toward the high utility character even when making an unrelated judgment
of who worked harder.
Finally, we hypothesized that participants would perceive the social context, but not the
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no social context, character as nice; and would perceive the social context character as the nicer
of the two. Participants perceived both characters as being nice (Helpful Character: n = 22,
observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a binomial test; No Social Context Character: n = 22,
observed proportion = .92, p < .001 in a binomial test). Participants did not significantly rate one
character as nicer than the other (Helpful Character, n = 13, observed proportion = .54; No Social
Context Character: n = 11, observed proportion = .46; one-tailed binomial test: p = .419).
Children viewed both the high utility and no utility (no social context) characters as being
helpful, as having worked hard, and as being nice. However, children did perceive a difference in
the characters, as they trended toward a preference for the Helpful Character when asked to
endorse one character’s provided novel word over the other’s. They also demonstrated a
perceived difference by rating the Helpful Character as having worked harder than the No Social
Context Character and trending toward rating the Helpful Character as more helpful.
Discussion
The current study aimed to better understand how children perceive and make epistemic
decisions about informants, particularly those who vary in effort and utility, two important
components of the warmth dimension of social cognition (e.g., Fiske et al., 2007). Participants
did not have a preference when considering characters who varied in effort but not in utility
when choosing whom to trust in a novel word learning task. The results were somewhat stronger
when participants were asked to choose between characters who varied in utility but not in effort.
Results were stronger still when participants compared a high utility character to a “no utility”
character who was removed from any social context. Participants’ perceptions of characters were
generally more nuanced in the explicit judgment items (i.e., choosing which character was more
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helpful, worked harder, or nicer). Children seem to favor characters who possess high levels of
utility to those with low utility or no utility.
There are several limitations to this study which may account for the results of the novel
word endorsement items and the more compelling results of the explicit judgment items. First,
children may not have generalized information learned in the scenarios presented to the novel
word endorsement items. It would be desirable to conduct another study in which the training
and testing item domains are more closely linked. Secondly, more conclusive results would
likely be found if this study were continued or conducted again with greater numbers of
participants. Several trends in the data fell just short of significance, particularly in Conditions 2
and 3, as noted above. Another possibility is that children of this age are yet incapable of actively
applying the insight they gain about characters in the training phase to the task of making
epistemic judgments in the novel word task. This would mirror previous results indicating that
children can detect deception by the age of 4, but can only apply this understanding when
making epistemic decisions beginning at the age of 5 (Vanderbilt et al., 2011). Finally, it should
be noted that this study tested the limits of children’s working memory. Given that children did
not have consistent results on the memory check items, it may be that they were simply unable to
track the complex information which was provided about each character.
Future research could examine the issue of children’s epistemic judgments in the warmth
domain of social cognition from other angles which were not investigated in the current study.
For example, replicating this study with altered conditions would serve to further understanding
of this field. As an example, the current study only presented characters who either possessed
positive qualities (e.g., high effort, high utility) or else lacked those particular attributes. Future
research could examine how children respond to characters who possess specifically negative
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qualities such as: various combinations of low effort, irrelevancy, and hindrance / obstruction of
a goal (i.e., the opposite of high utility). Continuing to investigate the implications of the “no
social context” condition from this study in comparison to other conditions would be of
particular interest.
Learning about the world happens often in the context of personal interactions; yet these
interactions may not always be with helpful or competent individuals who are both able and
willing to satisfactorily instruct the learner (Shafto et al., 2012). Because of this, it becomes
necessary for learners, particularly young children, to become capable of taking a critical stance
toward informants in potentially epistemic situations (Mills, 2013). This study sought to further
uncover the processes by which these epistemic judgments occur, specifically in the “warmth”
dimension of social cognition (Fiske et al., 2007). By examining how children perceive and
make decisions regarding characters varying in effort and utility, we learned that children are
likely inclined to attend more closely to the utility of an informant’s actions (helpfulness,
usefulness, serviceableness) than to an informant’s high exertion of effort.
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